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aBStract
One of the principal conditions to assure the long-term development and 
success of the liberal international economic and political order is the return to 
a stable, equitable and rule-based international monetary order . This is in the 
interests of large and small, rich and poor and “emerging” countries alike . In fact, 
the absence since the 1970s of a universal monetary order and the prevailing 
monetary nationalism and regionalism at a time of globalization and global 
finance have been responsible for a lack of equitable adjustment mechanisms 
and of effective checks and balances on financial and fiscal excesses in the world 
economy .  The recurring financial crises have been hurting the economies not only 
of the poorer but by now also of the richest economies . The task of designing, 
negotiating and implementing a new international monetary order is clearly a 
combined political and economic and security challenge . A possible approach 
for a new design could be inspired by the original “European Monetary System” 
(EMS) . The responsibility for this initiative for an “Extended EMS” belongs first 
and foremost to the three principal market economies: the United States, the 
European Union and Japan . From the start this “Extended EMS” would benefit 
the entire world economy – including the major new powers such as Brazil, China 
and India, and the weaker economies that suffer the most from the recurring 
financial crises . In the long run it would also be open to new members in order 
to become a truly universal system . But it is only the commitment and active 
participation of the three main pillars of the liberal international economic order, 
the US, Europe and Japan could be the guaranty of success: the absence of 
either one of the three would inevitably lead to failure with dire consequences for 
the outlook for an integrated and prosperous world economy .   
Keywords: International Monetary Order; Reform of International 
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States; Europe; Japan; Multidisciplinarity; International Order; Emilio Fontela; 
Globalization; Global Finance .
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reSumen
Una de las principales condiciones para asegurar el desarrollo a largo plazo 
y el éxito del orden económico y político liberal internacional es la vuelta a 
un orden monetario internacional estable y regulado . Ello puede beneficiar 
tanto a países grandes como a pequeños, ya sean desarrollados o en vías 
de desarrollo . De hecho, la ausencia de un orden monetario internacional 
desde 1970 y el regionalismo y nacionalismo monetario han provocado la 
inexistencia de mecanismos de ajuste equitativos y equilibradotes de los 
excesos de la economía mundial . Las crisis financieras recurrentes han 
dañado las economías no sólo de los países más pobres, sino también de los 
ricos . La tarea de diseñar, negociar e implantar un nuevo orden monetario 
internacional es un reto que combina aspectos económicos y políticos . Un 
posible acercamiento a este diseño puede estar inspirado por el Sistema 
Monetario Europeo (SME) original . La responsabilidad de llevar a cabo un 
“SME ampliado” corresponde principalmente a las tres economías de mercado 
más importantes: Estados Unidos, la Unión Europea y Japón . La implantación 
de este “SME ampliado” beneficiaría a toda la economía mundial –incluyendo 
las economías emergentes como Brasil, China e India, y otras más débiles 
que sufren principalmente los efectos de las crisis financieras recurrentes– . A 
largo plazo el sistema podría ampliarse a nuevos miembros, de modo que se 
convirtiera en un auténtico sistema universal . Pero únicamente el compromiso 
y la participación de las tres principales economías –Estados Unidos, la 
Unión Europea y Japón– podría garantizar su éxito . Es más, la ausencia de 
cualquiera de ellas conllevaría de forma inevitable el fracaso del sistema, con 
las consecuencias que ello implicaría para el desarrollo de una economía 
mundial integrada y próspera .
Palabras clave: Orden Monetario Internacional; Reforma del Orden 
Monetario Internacional; Sistema Monetario Europeo (SME); “SME ampliado”; 
Estados Unidos; Unión Europea; Japón; Multidisciplinariedad; Orden 
internacional; Emilio Fontela; Globalización; Finanzas globales .
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The goal is not that the United States and Japan should “join” the EMS or 
the European Monetary Union as such, but that they should negotiate with 
the European Union a monetary system that will have similar objectives and 
similar rules to those of the original EMS. (Hieronymi, 1993).
…Japan, even more than the United States, needs a system of multilateral 
rules rather than ad hoc, bilateral negotiations under mutual threats and 
accusations. (Toyoo Gyothen in Volker, P. and Gyothen, T., 1992).
1 . multidiSciplinarity and Specialization
International monetary order ought to be a relatively simple concept 
so that its organizing principles, its rules and day-to-day functioning can be 
understood and respected by all actors from households, to companies, banks 
and other financial intermediaries and governments and central banks . 
In reality the issue of “international monetary order” is an eminently complex 
and multidisciplinary one: economic, political, social, financial, institutional, 
technological and security issues are intimately linked, with domestic, regional 
and international dimensions playing an important role .
Also, one of the political and intellectual challenges of our age is how to 
reconcile, on the one hand, the growing complexity, interdependence and 
globalization of economic, political, social and technological developments that 
call for multi-disciplinary analyses and solutions, and, on the other hand, the 
specialization and the increasingly narrow and abstract approach of economics, 
political science and of the study of international relations . This becomes a 
major problem especially at times of crises and breaks in trend when there is 
a need, or even compulsion and an opportunity to innovate . If this dichotomy 
is not properly handled, the outcome is often improvisation rather than action 
based on an in-depth understanding of the complexity of issues and of a careful 
weighing of possible options and of their consequences . There are few areas 
in economics and politics where this has been more true than in the field of 
money and of domestic and international monetary reform .
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The choice of the topic of the present article was motivated by the author’s 
interest in the multiple aspects of European-Japanese-American relations1, an 
interest shared during several decades with Emilio Fontela to whose memory 
the issue of this Journal is dedicated . This choice was also based on the belief 
in the relevance of this subject and on the experience of seeing long-discarded 
or minority views (right ones or wrong ones) replace conventional wisdom 
often at the most unexpected moments – an observation and experience also 
frequently shared with Fontela . 
He knew that the task of decision-makers and the forecasters who help 
them is to look forward and the study of the lessons of the past is a tool and 
not an objective . One of the principal contributions of Emilio Fontela was the 
ability to address systematically the following three challenges and to develop 
and provide the tools for others for dealing with them: 
First: Recognizing the complexity of the world and of the objects of our 
analysis and trying to break down the walls between the various disciplines 
relevant for problems and questions at hand . 
Second: Addressing the issue of the interaction between, on the one hand, 
constant change, and, on the other hand, the weight of structures and trends, 
and emphasizing the role of innovation in economics, politics, technology, at 
all levels . 
Third: Reminding researchers of their duty to be “relevant”, and keeping 
them from discouragement even if their conclusions and recommendations are 
not followed by practitioners or accepted by fellow scholars, and even if this 
relevance becomes evident only with a long time lag . 
2 . reform of the international monetary SyStem: a renewed call for an 
“extended emS”
There is no doubt that the current crisis has been as much the result 
of intellectual rigidity and dogmatism as of objective economic factors and 
interests . As long as these dogmas continue to prevail and  prevent debate and 
innovation about the international monetary order, the chances of true reform 
will be small .
Since September 2008 there has been a multiplication of initiatives, 
speeches, conferences, proposals and analyses throughout the world dealing with 
the nature, the origins and consequences of the current international financial 
and banking crisis and with the need, beside short-term crisis management, for 
fundamental long-term reforms to avoid a recurrence of such a crisis . 
In the ongoing debate about the current crisis, the principal concern in the 
US, Europe and in Japan – as well as in the rest of the world economy – is 
1 The present paper is part of an ongoing research project, started by the author in early 2009, under 
the title Renewing the Western Community: the Challenge for the US, Europe and Japan .
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how to stop the contraction in the world economy and downward pressures 
that emanate from both the monetary sector and from the so-called “real 
economy” . 
These are legitimate preoccupations as the short-term, more than ever, is 
bound to have a major impact on the long-term trend of the world economy, 
both on the overall growth and on the relative positions of the “losers” and 
“winners” . However, these short-term concerns and the policies they inspire 
(and the fallacy of the immediate effectiveness of fiscal or monetary measures) 
tend to distract both policy makers and the broader public from the potential 
consequences of the improvisation and of the excessive fiscal and monetary 
measures that have been the order of the day since the fourth quarter of 2008 
in the majority of the OECD countries . “Who will pay the price?” is a rhetorical 
question that is often raised, but it is rarely defined what is mean by “the price” 
and what is meant by the “who” .
2 .1 . a “Great aBSent” in the current reform deBate
Yet, notwithstanding the breadth and width of the debate and the readiness 
by some of the most conservative organizations and decision makers to 
reverse direction on instant notice and to advocate and to adopt measures 
of fiscal and monetary largesse that go against all precedent and against 
the minimum of prudential fiscal and monetary policies and management – 
there is a “great absent” in this debate and activity . There is, in fact, little, if 
any reference to the issue of international monetary order, and to the need 
to rebuild a true international monetary order and to redefine the role and 
responsibilities of governments and central banks for international monetary 
stability . 2
While from time to time there are vague allusions to a “need for a new 
Bretton Woods”, most of them have nothing to do either with the actual 
meaning of “Bretton Woods” or with the current and future needs for a new 
international monetary order . In fact: there are no coherent proposals for the 
objectives, organizing principles, scope, rules and institutions of such a new 
order, nor for the clear definition of the division of labor and responsibilities 
between, official national and international institutions, on the one hand, and 
of various categories of private market participants,on the other hand .
The lack of awareness of this issue is striking not only in the case of the 
IMF (whose deafening silence on global international monetary order has 
been noted for decades), and other prominent international bodies such as 
the BIS, the OECD, the Group of 20, etc ., but also from the most eloquent and 
fertile critics of the current system and proponents of wide-ranging reforms 
such as Joseph Stiglitz. It is no exaggeration that as of now – mid-2009 – 
2 Cf. for example Group of 20 (2 April 2009) The Global Plan for Recovery and Reform, London, 2 
April 2009
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international monetary reform (as distinguished from financial and banking 
oversight) is not on the intellectual, political and institutional reform agenda . 
The various suggestions to create “macro-prudential” oversight bodies at the 
European or broader international level fall far short of the requirements 
in terms of transparency, predictability and most importantly of rules that 
are binding for both large and small countries, of an international monetary 
system . 
2 .2 . a renewed call for an “extended emS”
Fifteen years ago, the present writer launched an appeal for an “extended 
EMS”:
“In the 1980s concerns about tensions and potential conflicts in the 
relations of Japan, EC and the United States seemed to be linked mainly to 
trade issues. In the early 1990s, however, the sharp differences in monetary 
policies between Germany and the United States led not only to tensions 
between the two sides of the Atlantic, but ultimately to a severe crisis within 
the EMS as well. No doubt, the success of the Uruguay-Round negotiations 
is of the utmost importance for prosperity in the coming decade in the 
industrialized and in the developing countries. Nevertheless, it is in the area 
of international monetary relations that a bold new initiative is the most 
urgently needed: an agreement similar to the European Monetary System 
(EMS), which would include beside the European Union, also Japan and the 
United States.” Hieronymi (1995:61). Today the need for such an approach is 
even greater than in the 1990s. And the current crisis and the lessons of from 
the last fifteen years ought to increase the political chances for its becoming 
a reality . 
3 . international monetary reform: a political and economic challenGe
One of the key assumptions of the architects of the post-war liberal 
international economic order was the close link between trade liberalization, 
on the one hand, and a properly functioning international monetary system, 
on the other hand . 
Yet, one of the principal economic and political paradoxes of the period 
since the 1970s has been the contrast between the absence of an effective 
international monetary order, on the one hand, and the growing “globalization” 
of trade, finance and investments . 
This was caused by, and reinforced the belief that private financial agents 
and markets could replace the functions that used to be fulfilled but what 
used to go under the designation of “international monetary order” . This 
“freed” governments and central banks of international responsibilities at a 
time when internationalization of finance became the dominant feature of 
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the world economy . 3 The current monetary and banking crisis is a dramatic 
demonstration of the consequences of this dichotomy . 
It is the central conclusion of the present article that the reform of the 
international monetary system is an essential task in order to maintain and 
strengthen a liberal international economic order . Without the rebuilding of a 
stable and equitable international monetary order there is little chance for a 
“soft landing” from the current crisis and for avoiding recurring new financial 
crises .
3 .1 . the multiple dimenSionS of international order
The current and future challenge for international order can be summed 
up by the following quote: “The quality of international order depends on 
the quality of the underlying organizing principles, on shared values and on 
their implementation. Globalization without freedom and democracy, without 
cooperation and solidarity and social progress, without subsidiarity and without 
effective checks on the abuse of power by governments or private actors, 
without a balanced division of tasks and responsibilities between the public 
and the private sectors, without peace and respect for human rights, cannot 
work. In order to assure the success and the benefits of globalization for all in 
the long run, there is a need for a new spirit and a new practice of federalism in 
the world.”4 (Hieronymi, Bensky and Stoyanova, 2008) . International order has 
multiple dimensions: the political and security dimensions, trade, money and 
finance, human rights and increasingly the environment . International monetary 
order is relevant not only from the point of view of economic order, but it is also 
closely connected with the political dimension and with international order 
as a whole . It is the quality of these various dimensions, their convergence or 
conflict that determine the nature and the stability or fragility of international 
order at any given time or in any region . 
International order does not necessarily mean “universal order”, although 
time and again the two concepts have been confused . The last hundred years in 
particular have seen systematic efforts to create or to impose a truly universal 
international order . Yet, the co-existence of parallel (regional) international 
orders has been the rule rather than the exception ever since 1914. Also, one 
can also distinguish between complete, fully operational international orders 
and “partial” or “incomplete” orders . 
3 On “global finance” see Chapter 1 in Hieronymi, Otto (Editor) (2009) Globalization and the Reform 
of the International Banking and Monetary System, Palgrave Macmillan, London 2009
4 Hieronymi, Otto, Bensky, D . and Stoyanova, Toyoo (2008) “What Future Domestic and International 
Political Order for the World?” Spirali, Milano, Paul1 . These conclusions, written in early 2008 
have gained further relevance through the outbreak of the world wide crisis in the summer and 
fall of last year and through recognition of the need for both greater government responsibilities 
and international cooperation in order to uphold the open, democratic model at the national and 
international level .
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In fact, more often than not, true international order is “regional” (and 
the term regional does not necessarily correspond to geographic definitions) 
than truly universal . For example this was the case during the “cold war” when 
there were three quite distinct “international orders” (or sub-orders) primarily 
defined by the domestic political orders of the various groups of countries and 
the relations within and between the members of these groups . 
These three “sub-orders” were the “Western world”, the “Communist 
world” and the “Third World” . The United Nations represented an attempt at a 
universal order: it was, however, at best a partial or imperfect order, primarily 
because the communist countries as a whole and many of the so-called “third-
world” countries individually and as a group refused to or were unable to fulfill 
some of the most basic principles and obligations defined in the UN Charter 
and other basic documents .
International order is the result essentially of three categories of factors: 1 . 
a given structure and in particular the main actors and their behavior and the 
evolution of this structure and actors; 2 . major, mostly unexpected events and 
breaks in trends (wars, revolutions, etc .); and importantly 3 . explicit efforts, on 
the basis of shared values and interests, through agreements and institutions 
to create a new international order (peace treaties, pacts, conventions, 
international organizations, etc .) . 
3 .2 . parameterS of international order
International order in its multiple dimensions depends on the characteristics 
of the issues and the “technical” nature of the subject matter covered 
(telecommunications, military security, etc .) and on politics in broadest sense 
of the word . Fundamentally, international order is always political . International 
order defines the conditions of the cross-border interaction of states and their 
agents as well of non-state actors (individuals, companies, etc .), but which are 
one way or another “citizens” of one or several states .
All international orders (like all political orders) have a number of key aspects 
or parameters . It is the “content” or the characteristics of these parameters, and 
their relative importance or hierarchy within a given order that will determine 
the nature of that order and distinguish it from other orders .
When one considers the different types or categories of international order 
(political, security, etc .) for each category or dimension one can identify a 
number of basic parameters – the contents or characteristics of which will 
determine the nature and the quality and the effectiveness of the particular 
aspect of international order . These parameters include: objectives, organizing 
principles, values, rules and customs, policies and institutions as well as power 
and resources . 
Sometimes the parameters of the various aspects or categories of international 
order converge, at times there are important differences and dichotomies for 
different aspects of international order for a given group of countries . These 
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differences may be intentional or accidental: they may or may not affect the 
overall cohesion of a given regional or global international order . 
A classic example of such a divergence was the international 
telecommunications order prior to the dramatic revolution of deregulation, 
liberalization and privatization in what used to be a strictly monopolistic 
and heavily regulated sector even in the most open market economies . 
This dichotomy between trade liberalization in goods and services on the 
one hand (and essentially trade conducted by private companies), and 
telecommunications monopolies, price controls, subsidies and generally closed 
markets, on the other hand, led to revolutionary change in the international 
telecommunications order in the 1980s and 1990s. 
The example of telecommunications is also a good illustration of the close 
connection between domestic and international order . Contrary to the views 
of the more extreme exponents of the so-called realist theory of international 
relations, who argue that there is and should be a clear distinction between 
domestic and international order, in fact, in the real world there is a close 
interdependence between the nature and the quality of domestic and of 
international order . Also, in most cases it is the domestic dimension that 
determines the international one rather than the other way around .
Of course, the most dramatic example of differences in the pace of 
liberalization and of evolving domestic and international regulations has been 
the contrast between finance and banking, on the one hand, and the trade in 
manufactured products, on the other hand . Following the Second World War, 
up until the 1970s international (and domestic) banking and finance were a 
highly regulated sector compared with the progress of liberalization of trade 
and the international integration through trade and direct investments by 
multinational companies of the “real sector” . Banks had a hard time following 
their clients into the growing international markets. After the early 1970s, 
the growing momentum of financial and banking “deregulation” led not 
only to a “catching-up” with the “real” side of the economy, but finance (and 
increasingly short-term finance) became the engine of what is known today 
as “globalization” .5
5 Cf . the concern repeatedly expressed by Alexandre Lamfalussy, one of the leadig monetary 
statesmen of our time, about the combined effects of domestic financial and banking deregulation 
and liberalization of international capital movements cf. Lamfalussy, Alexandre (1987) “Current-
Account Imbalances in the Industrial World: Why They Matter” Kenen, Peter B. (Editor) (1987) 
International Monetary Cooperation: Essays in Honor of Henry C. Wallich, Essays in International 
Finance, No. 169, December 1987, International Finance Section, Princeton University, Princeton, 
N .J . pp . 31-37 Lamfalussy, Alexandre: Financial Markets in Emerging Markets. An Essay on Financial 
Globalisation and Fragility, Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 2000 . See also Otto 
Hieronymi “From Global Finance to the Crisis of Globalization”, Chapter 1 in Hieronymi, Otto (Editor) 
(2009) Globalization and the Reform of the International Banking and Monetary System, Palgrave 
Macmillan, London 2009
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3 .3 . domeStic and international monetary order: ruleS vS . marketS
The principal functions of a domestic monetary order, in a liberal market 
economy can be summed up in the following points: 1 . facilitating sustained 
and stable growth, 2 . providing a basis for stability and predictability of values 
(prices) 3 . help to avoid artificial (not market conform) redistribution of incomes 
and assets .
The questions that have occupied economists, political analysts as well as 
officials for many years include: 
What should be the distribution of responsibilities for “money” among 
the various factors and actors; “rules” vs . “policies”, “government policies” vs . 
markets;  what should be the signals, indicators that should guide the decisions 
of officials and of market participants; what should be the weight of “domestic” 
and of “international” considerations; and finally, what factors (domestic price 
stability, asset price stability, external price stability, freedom of exchange, 
etc .) should be determinant?
Who is in charge? Money is probably the single most important element of 
a market economy . Without a properly working monetary system there could 
be no market economy . Also, one of the inherent weaknesses of the planned, 
socialist economies was their inability to deal with the functions of money in 
an efficient and equitable way . Although the communist system continued 
to use “money”, in fact the true functions of money were corrupted, and the 
communists could find neither in theory nor in practice an adequate substitute 
for money . 
The term “sound money” is no longer used in political discourse or in the 
economic literature . Yet, the concept remains a fundamental one: “fighting 
inflation”, “inflation-targeting”, etc . are contemporary (although more limited) 
expressions of the traditional concept of sound money . The links between 
“monetary crises” and “political crises” have been demonstrated in the last 
twenty years, just as well as in earlier decades or in past centuries . 
To what extent is money a public responsibility and what is the role and 
responsibility of markets? For centuries money – definition and creation – was 
part of the exclusive responsibilities of the ruler . It was one of the principal 
aspects of sovereignty . He or she who had no sovereign power over money 
was not really a sovereign ruler . Coinage and the definition and imposition 
of “legal tender” – the money that all had to accept were essential elements 
of sovereign power . Refusing to accept “legal tender” in payment of debts or 
in other transactions, was punished by the law – just as counterfeiting was a 
capital crime . But money was also the most direct and tangible expression 
of trust or lack of trust in the sovereign . If there was no trust it took the most 
severe and oppressive measures by those in power to impose the legal tender 
as an effective money, i .e . fulfilling the traditional functions of money . 
Some of the most systematic and cruel violations against basic human rights 
carried out by the Communist, national-socialist or other totalitarian regimes in 
the twentieth century was against their citizens accused of violating “monetary 
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or currency regulations” . The alleged justification of these regulations was to 
uphold the “common good”, but in fact in most cases they were necessary to 
cover up the inefficient and arbitrary nature of these regimes and to cope with 
the basic lack of trust of the citizens in their own government .
Throughout most of history the “trust” that governments required in the 
currency over which they exercised sovereignty was based not only on the 
“honesty” or the “wisdom” of the government that has the monopoly power, 
but also on “objective” factors, beyond the political or physical control of 
governments, i .e . on the production and availability of “precious metals”, i .e . 
gold and to a lesser extent silver . 
The “gold standard”, based on the link between money or currency defined 
by governments, on the one hand, and the amount of gold they (or their de 
facto agents) actually owned, on the other hand, was first and foremost a 
domestic system, and only in the second place an international standard or 
order . The existence of this “objective”, material core, that created the basic 
trust and the illusion or reality of automaticity in responses to changes in the 
objective factors, i .e . official gold and later also of foreign exchange reserves . 
The gold standard, was never, and the “gold-exchange standard” even less, a 
fully automatic monetary standard6 .
Both the “gold-standard” and the “gold-exchange standard” were rule-based 
systems, with the rules being first and foremost domestic rules . While they 
were more or less strict and binding on the authorities, there was obviously 
scope for policy and not just an obligation to follow blindly rules .
When it is said that governments cannot be expected to accept binding rules 
because it would conflict with their “national sovereignty”, people forget that 
the primary restriction of a “rule-based” monetary system is on the domestic 
dimension of sovereignty and not on the external one .
International monetary order, like domestic monetary order has multiple 
functions . The functions and the very concept of money have been subject to 
change as a result of political and economic as well as of technological factors . 
The last hundred years have been particularly rich in terms of both positive and 
negative monetary experiences . The dramatic history of the 20th century has 
demonstrated once more the close link between the quality of money, on the one 
hand, and the quality of political and economic systems, on the other hand .
The success of an international order depends on its inherent qualities 
and on the political will of the countries involved to uphold it . Developing and 
maintaining international order is never “automatic” . One of the most common 
fallacies economics is the assumption that the “gold standard” was “automatic” 
and thus it was a-political and independent of the policies and interests of 
the states . As mentioned above, one of the fundamental assumptions of the 
architects of the post-war “Western” international order was the need for a 
6 Some of the most eminent writers contribute to the confusion when they do not distinguish in their 
texts between the “gold standard” and the “gold-exchange standard” . See for example Bernanke, Ben 
S .: Essays on the Great Depression, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2000 .
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convergence of the “international trade order” and of the “international 
monetary order” .  
3 .4 . monetary nationaliSm vS . financial GloBalization
The current financial and economic crisis is only the latest and so far the 
most severe in the series of international crises that occurred since the 1970s. 
The principal causes of these crises, including the present one have to do with 
the dichotomy between, on the one hand, growing monetary nationalism (or 
regionalism) by the major economic and financial powers, and, on the other 
hand, the rapidly advancing financial globalization in the world economy and the 
“privatization” of the precautionary functions of money and monetary policy .7
The central theme of the debate about international monetary order is 
to what extent and through what tools should the domestic economy (and in 
particular the financial and monetary sectors) be isolated from the rest of the 
world and to what extent external developments harmful or not for domestic 
conditions and in particular for the “freedom of action” of national treasuries 
and central banks and for private savers and financial intermediaries . 
One of the essential roles of monetary order – both domestic and international 
– is to help avoid financial and fiscal excesses, both by government agents and 
by the private sector (including banks and other financial intermediaries) . This 
is a “fourth element” – distinct but closely linked to the other three traditional 
functions that are: 1 . facilitating trade (convertibility in the international area), 
2 . measure of value (avoiding distortions of relative prices in the domestic 
economy and internationally, and 3 . providing a reliable store of value (i .e . 
avoiding erratic upward and downward fluctuations in asset prices) . 
The cause of the breakdown of Bretton Woods was the revival of monetary 
nationalism and floating exchange rates further exacerbated this trend . 
Monetary nationalism became the de facto global international standard 
when the attempts to replace the Bretton Woods system were abandoned 
in the 1970s with the Second Reform of the Articles of Agreement of the 
International Monetary Fund . The need for a return to a stable international 
monetary order has been pointed out ever since the 1970s by numerous 
economists and also political analysts . 8 The calls for reform were rejected 
7 Cf . Danthine, Jean-Pierre and Donaldson, John B . (2005) Intermediate Financial Theory, 2nd Edition, 
Elsevier Academic Press, Amsterdam, 2005 .
8 One of the most articulate and prolific advocates of a return to a rule-based international monetary 
order incorporating a system of stable exchange rates has been Professor Robert Mundell . Although 
he received the Nobel Prize in economics primarily for his early work on “optimum currency areas”, 
over the last four decades he has consistently fought against the misuse of this concept to support 
monetary nationalism and floating exchange rates . Cf .  Mundell, Robert: “Monetary Nationalism and 
Floating Exchange Rates”, in Hieronymi, Otto (Editor): The New Economic Nationalism, Macmillan, 
London, 1980, pp. 34-50. See also Hieronymi, Otto (Editor) (1980) The New Economic Nationalism, 
Macmillan, London, 1980; Hieronymi, Otto (1982) “In Search of a New Economics for the 1980s: The 
Need for a Return to Fixed Exchange Rates’’, in Hieronymi, Otto (Editor) International Order: A View from 
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using different political and economic arguments . 
The new orthodoxy was based on a number of arguments: (1) the absence 
of a rule based system was unavoidable because domestic monetary and 
fiscal autonomy is a non-negotiable objective; (2) a rule-based system is not 
“enforceable” because it goes against market forces; (3) there is a conflict of 
national interests; (4) the world is not an optimum currency area; (5) floating 
exchange rates will help avoid fundamental balance-of-payments disequilibria; 
(6) monetary sovereignty is an absolute good; (7) the risks against currency 
fluctuations can be covered at a relatively low costs; (8) a stable system was 
in the interest of small countries and not so much for large countries, and in 
particular not of the United States .9
The “gold-exchange standard” under the Bretton Woods system was the 
expression of a strong political will to create a new and stable international order 
and to avoid the consequences of the monetary disorders of the 1930s.
It is symptomatic that the current conventional view among specialists of 
international and of monetary economics (the “revisionists” of yesterday) is 
that “international economic order” cannot be reconciled with the legitimate 
objectives of domestic politics and of domestic policy objectives .
Also, in their historical analyses they not only point out the generally 
recognized shortcomings of the both versions of the gold-exchange standard (the 
1930s and the Bretton Woods version), but they also tend to argue that countries 
were better off without an international monetary standard . They do neglect to 
a significant extent to analyze the economic and political consequences of the 
breakdown and of the absence of an international monetary order .
The development of worldwide integration required both markets, dynamic 
private sector competition and effective government policies, and cooperation 
to bring about gradual liberalization and the reduction of obstacles to trade and 
payments and to provide the necessary regulatory framework at the national 
and international levels . 
A multilateral system of trade liberalization and a stable international 
monetary order – both with binding rules and commitments – were the twin 
Geneva, Annals of International Studies Institut Universitaire de Hautes Etudes Internationales,Volume 
12, pp 107-126, Geneva, 1982; Hieronymi, Otto (1998) “Agenda for a New Monetary Reform”, in 
Futures, Vol. 30, No.8 pp. 769-781, Pergamon, Elsevier Science Ltd., Hieronymi, Otto (Editor) (2009) 
Globalization and the Reform of the International Banking and Monetary System, Palgrave Macmillan, 
London 2009. On the issue of  Mundell and “optimum currency areas” cf.  Mundell, Robert A. (1997) 
“Optimum Currency Areas”, Extended version of a luncheon speech presented at a Conference on 
Optimum Currency Areas, Tel-Aviv University, December 5, 1997,  Mundell, Robert: International 
Economics, E-book Robert  Mundell and Padoa-Schioppa, Tommaso (2004) The Euro and Its Central 
Bank, Getting United After The Union, The MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass ., 2004, Paul12 . 
9 The authors of a recent book found the apt term “monetary nationalism as a science” to characterize 
the conditions that have prevailed since the 1970s and the theories to justify them. While very 
critical of US policies, the authors stop far short of advocating a reform that would re-impose binding 
international rules on the United States . This would be too much for the current members of the 
prestigious Council on Foreign Relations. Steil, Benn and Hinds, Manuel (2009) Money, Markets and 
Sovereignty, A Council on Foreign Relations Book, Yale University Press, New Haven, Conn., 2009, 
Paul 137 .
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objectives and innovations in the ambitious plans for the postwar international 
economic order . They became the basis of the spectacular reconstruction of 
the war-torn societies, of the expansion of the world economy and not the least 
of the successful catching-up of Europe and Japan with the US economy . 
3 .5 . do we need an international monetary order?
There is a sharp contrast between, on the one hand, the activism about the 
re-regulation and reform of the financial and banking system, and, on the other 
hand, the relative silence about the disequilibria and the need for reform in the 
international monetary system . There are oblique references to the issue of global 
imbalances and the size of the dollar holdings of some of the emerging countries, 
in particular China, but no plans for rebuilding the international monetary order 
or even a recognition that the excesses in the financial and banking area have 
been a direct consequence of the absence of a global international monetary 
order . There is also a contrast between the fear of the rise of protectionism (the 
failure to get the Doha Development Round off the ground had been a major 
warning sign just as the multiplication of bilateral and frankly discriminatory 
trade agreements throughout the world in open breach of the spirit of GATT-
WTO) and the lack of concern about rampant monetary nationalism .
Some continue to ask the question: do we need at all an international 
monetary order? And in particular the big and the powerful such as the United 
States, the European Union or Japan, are they not better off without having 
to conform to the rules of an international monetary order? Is this not only a 
problem for small and weak countries – and these can tag on to the coattails 
of one of the powerful currencies (as this is witnessed by the cacophonic range 
of “exchange-rate regimes” followed by the 190 or so sovereign member states 
of the United Nations)? 10
It ought to be clear by now not only to “laymen”, but also to the experts and 
the private and public policy-makers in the most powerful universities, banks, 
treasuries and central banks who had been caught off guard, that without 
“monetary order”, international banking and finance cannot adequately fulfill 
their functions in an integrated world economy . The cumulative impact on the 
“real economy” – trade, investments, competition and innovation – could lead 
to a significant slowdown in economic growth in the long term .
There have been many warnings about the consequences of the refusal 
since the 1970s to rebuild the international monetary system11 after it broke 
down (or rather it was broken in the early 1970s not by private speculation, or 
the force of the markets, as the legend has it, but by government and central 
10 Cf .  Sharma, Shalendra D .: The Asian Financial Crisis. Crisis, Reform and Recovery, Manchester 
University Press, Manchester, 2003
11 Cf. Hieronimy, Otto (1998) “Agenda for a New Monetary Reform”, in Futures, Vol . 30, No .8 pp . 
769-781, Pergamon, Elsevier Science Ltd.; Hieronimy, Otto (Editor) (1980) The New Economic 
Nationalism, Macmillan, London, 1980
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bank policies of some of the most powerful members of the international 
financial community: the United States, France, Germany and probably also 
Britain, Italy and Switzerland, with Japan standing on the sidelines) . 
The following is only a random quote, this time from Paul Volcker, who 
himself had been involved in the “end of Bretton Woods”, but who had come to 
see and to regret its negative consequences: “It is hard to see how business can 
effectively calculate lasting comparative advantage when relative costs and 
prices are subject to exchange rate swings of 25 to 50 percent or more. There 
is no sure or costless way of hedging against all uncertainties; the only sure 
beneficiaries are those manning the trading desks and inventing the myriad 
of new devices to reduce risks – or to facilitate speculation.” Volcker, Paul 
and Gyothen, Toyoo (1992). 12Yet, even most of those who were outspoken 
advocates of a return to a rule-based international order tended to argue that 
this was the most important for small countries and that large countries (such 
as the United States) or large “optimum currency areas” (such as Western 
Europe) could better afford the lack of an international monetary order . 
In fact, the present writer belonged for many years to a minority within 
a minority – that is to the relatively small group economists and students of 
politics who argued that in an integrated world economy it was as important 
or even more important for the large economies (in particular for the United 
States) to belong to a well-functioning international monetary order as for small 
or medium-sized economies .13 This conclusion was derived from the theory of 
the various roles – economic and political – of domestic and international 
monetary order and from the analysis of the behavior of small and large 
country governments .  
3 .6 . whoSe fault iS it?
The principal thesis of this article is that the United States, Europe and Japan 
– individually and collectively – have a major responsibility to cooperate closely 
in rebuilding, designing and implementing a new international monetary order . 
The United States, Western Europe and Japan – through sins of commission 
and sins of omission – share the responsibility for abandoning in the 1970s the 
efforts for an effective reform of the international monetary system and for not 
attempting ever since to rebuild a new international monetary order . 
Without their joint efforts the other countries are unlikely to be willing or 
able to undertake a systematic effort to rebuild an international monetary 
order without the active participation of the three major market powers . 
12 Volcker, Paul and Gyothen, Toyoo (1992) Changing Fortunes: The World’s Money and the Threat to 
American Leadership, Times Books, New York, 1992, Paul293.
13 Hieronymi, Otto (1982) “In Search of a New Economics for the 1980s: The Need for a Return to 
Fixed Exchange Rates’’, in Hieronimy, Otto (Editor) International Order: A View from Geneva, Annals 
of International Studies Institut Universitaire de Hautes Etudes Internationales,Volume 12, pp 107-
126, Geneva, 1982.
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This is in their own interests and in the interests of the international 
community as a whole . There are strong economic as well as political arguments 
supporting this conclusion . This is not a new idea, but it has never been really 
taken up in a systematic manner by any one of what we can call the three 
pillars of the liberal international economic and political order .14
4 . the united StateS, europe and Japan: the three pillarS of the liBeral 
international order
The “Western international order” built in the wake of World War II has 
been responsible for the emergence and consolidation of the most successful 
community of free nations in history, and has been responsible for permanent 
peace among its members, democracy and freedom and for unprecedented 
economic prosperity and social progress . This was and remains a community 
open to all countries respecting the three fundamental security, political and 
economic conditions: no war or threat of war among the members, respect 
for human rights and political freedom, and economic integration and market 
economy . 
The three principal “pillars” of this liberal, democratic, “Western” Community 
were and remain: the United States, Europe and Japan . 15
It is in the area of economic relations and of economic integration that the 
achievements of the Western countries have been the most spectacular and 
have had the most far-reaching impact also on the rest of the world .
The economic relations among the “three pillars” have been characterized 
by competition and convergence, by policy differences and often acrimonious 
arguments and by a solid consensus about the importance for each of them 
and for the world economy as a whole of maintaining a common framework for 
an open and liberal international economic order .
14 Hieronymi, Otto (1995) “The Case for an ‘Extended EMS’: A New International Monetary Order 
to be Built by Europe, Japan and the United States”, in Szabo-Pelsoeczy, Miklos (Editor): The Global 
Monetary System After the Fall of the Soviet Empire, (In Memoriam Robert Triffin – 1911-1993, 
Sixth Conference of the Robert Triffin-Sziràk Foundation, Sziràk, 1993), Averbury, Aldershot, 
1995, pp. 57-67; “I therefore think it would be useful to create a kid of triumvirate of the United 
States, Japan and Europe, perhaps with Germany as the representative of Europe if that is what the 
Europeans wan Toyoo The central banks would of course have to be represented on this triumvirate 
because we are dealing with currencies, but the finance ministers must also be there because they 
represent the elected governments . They are able to speak about political dynamics but not much 
else; central bankers are good to talk about markets but not much else .” Toyoo Gyothen in Volcker, 
Paul and Gyothen, Toyoo (1992) Changing Fortunes: The World’s Money and the Threat to American 
Leadership, Times Books, New York, 1992 Paul 307.
15 “The outstanding examples of successful community building in the 20th century were the Western 
Community and European integration following the Second World War . These ought to remain 
essential pillars also in the future of the liberal democratic international order . As already argued 
above, their emergence and working and general experience are highly relevant for the pattern of 
political communities in the democratic and globalized world of tomorrow .” Hieronymi, Otto, Bensky, 
Daniela and Stoyanova, Teofana (2008) “What Future Domestic and International Political Order for 
the World?” Spirali, Milano .
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The US, Europe and Japan saw the fight against protectionism – in times of 
both rapid growth and even more at times of recession – as both an economic 
and a political responsibility . Whatever the frictions, whatever the high-profile 
disagreements and elaborate negotiating tactics, there was a fundamental 
agreement that a return to protectionism would be a major threat not only to 
economic prosperity but also to security in the world . 
The degree of integration – at the level of trade, technology, production 
and of financial and direct investments among these “three pillars” of the world 
economy have  reached a degree that the most optimistic of the early architects 
of the post-war international economic order could have never imagined . 
While GATT and subsequently WTO provided the global, multilateral 
framework for the international trade order, there was ample room for bilateral 
negotiations, tensions and tacit or open agreements . Without the long-term 
commitment to the principles of a liberal trading system by the US, Europe and 
Japan, today’s globalized world economy would have never come about: there 
would be a lesser degree of economic integration, a lesser degree of technology 
diffusion and the so-called emerging economies of today and tomorrow would 
have had less of a chance or will have a lesser chance in the future, to enter on 
a successful path of growth and development . Without the combined efforts 
of the US, Europe and Japan over the decades in favor of an integrated, open 
world economy, the new “emerging economies” – China, India and Brazil, to 
mention only the three most important ones – would not have had a serious 
chance for catching up .
Today, as a result of the crisis in the international banking and financial 
system, the task of rebuilding the international monetary order is not only 
necessary but it ought to be also politically more feasible than any time since 
the 1990s. However, this can only happen if the US, Europe and Japan decide 
to work together and agree on rebuilding the international monetary system . 
The first and most obvious argument why these three have to work together 
and why success or failure depends essentially on them, has to do with the 
size and weight of these market economies in the world economy and in the 
monetary system as a whole .
A perhaps even more important argument is that each of the three, the US, 
Europe and Japan are responsible for the fact that there has been no return 
to a global international monetary order in the last thirty-five years: all three 
of them incurred both sins of commission and sins of omission in this context 
over the decades .
According to conventional wisdom and to the prevailing dogma mentioned 
above this has been due to their “self-interest” . According to this view the lack of 
initiative was motivated by their “diverging interests”: the common assumption 
was that each three of them was better off under this situation .
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4 .1 . the uS poSition: from internationaliSm to monetary nationaliSm
If there has been no serious effort to rebuild a stable international monetary 
order since the early 1970s, this has been first and foremost due to the 
intellectual rigidity of the majority of the American academic establishment and 
the lack of leadership shown by the political elite on this issue and their lack of 
courage to go against the “conventional wisdom” spread by the “experts” . 
Over the last three-and-a-half decades there was a vicious circle: (1) 
economists argued that a new rule-based system would be politically 
unacceptable to the US government and Congress, even if such a system 
were in the long-term interests of the United States; (2) politicians refused to 
address this issue – despite the obvious problems caused by the over- and 
under-valuation of the dollar, the impact on employment and on the long-term 
competitive position of American industry, and on the monetary and fiscal 
imbalances linked to the official disinterest in the balance of payments – 
because they were told that “professional economists” do not support the idea 
international monetary reform . 
The “experts” argued that there is no alternative to the non-system of wildly 
fluctuating exchange rates (the best one could hope was private hedging) and 
to the last minute they remained skeptical about the chances of the European 
countries to deal with this issue at the regional level . Political leaders remained 
passive, and at best bemoaned the instability in the US external accounts and 
the recurring international financial crises, but they simply took the “expert 
advice” coming from the most prestigious American Universities that nothing 
can and nothing should be done about it . 
Ever since the Nobel Prize in Economics was established, American or 
US-based economists received an overwhelming number of these annual 
distinctions: virtually all of them (and not only Milton Friedman) were explicit 
advocates of monetary nationalism and of floating exchange rates . The two 
most notable exceptions were Robert Mundell and the late Friedrich Hayek – 
not only were they free market economists they were, and Mundell still is, true 
monetary internationalists . Hayek, who is best known even among professional 
economists, for his very important (and influential) pamphlet The Road to 
Serfdom, was also a very important monetary theorists16, who profoundly 
disagreed with his fellow free-market advocate Milton Friedman about 
monetary theory and policy and in particular about relative-price distortions 
and fluctuations . As for Professor Robert Mundell, he probably spent more 
time in studying international monetary issues than all the pro-floating Nobel 
Prize winners put together . 
It is also interesting to mention briefly here the position of the last three 
Chairmen of the US Federal Reserve Board on the issue of the international 
16 Cf. Hayek, Friedrich .A. (1937, 1964) Monetary Nationalism and International Stability, Augustus 
M. Kelley, Reprints of Economic Classics, New York, and Hieronymi, Otto (Editor) (2009) Globalization 
and the Reform of the International Banking and Monetary System, Palgrave Macmillan, London 
2009 Chapter 1.
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monetary order, whose tenure encompasses the last three decades – from the 
late 1970s to the present day: Paul Volcker, Alan Greenspan and the current 
incumbent Ben Bernanke . 
Paul Volcker was without any doubt the most internationalist of the three . 
He did believe and continues to believe in the importance of a stable and 
equitable international monetary order and he does not believe in the virtues of 
freely floating exchange rates . Unfortunately, these views became more public 
knowledge after he left the Fed and had no longer direct policy responsibility 
and influence . Also unfortunately, once he retired and a “private citizen”, he 
never took the political initiative to use his immense prestige in America and 
in the world for the cause of international monetary order . While his speeches 
and other writings show nostalgia for global international monetary order and 
for US leadership in restoring such an order – there has never been a “Volcker 
Plan” for international monetary reform, and so far there seems to be none 
today either despite his renewed prominence as one the leading monetary and 
financial advisers of President Barack Obama . 17 
As for Alan Greenspan, a powerful, long-serving and highly respected and 
influential Fed Chairman, he was both a “Ayn-Randian” market extremist and the 
ultimate monetary nationalist . For Greenspan, much focused (more in theory than 
in practice) on budget deficits, the balance of payments of the United States was of 
no concern for the American Administration or for the Federal Reserve . “Finance” 
– national and international being one and the same thing – was the business of 
markets (including speculators) and the idea of internationally monetary reform 
was not only useless – it was positively harmful . 18In the light of developments 
in the last two years in the US and the world economy the reputation of Alan 
Greenspan as a wise central banker has been downgraded considerably, and not 
the least among his former admirers in the financial markets . Yet, on the issue of 
the international monetary system, too many American opinion leaders may still 
share his nationalistic and doctrinaire views .
Of course, among the three, the views of the current Chairman Ben 
Bernanke are the most relevant for the future of the American position on the 
issue of international monetary order . Not only does he hold his powerful office 
at a time of an unprecedented international financial crisis and at a time of 
equally unprecedented activism trying to fix the financial sector both through 
the injection of enormous amounts of central bank money and of government 
funds and through revising the “rules of the game” and changing the role and 
responsibilities of official bodies (including central banks) to guarantee the 
recovery and safe working of the financial sector . Chairman Bernanke was also 
17 CF. Volcker, Paul and Gyothen, Toyoo (1992) Changing Fortunes: The World’s Money and the Threat 
to American Leadership, Times Books, New York, 1992; Volcker, Paul (December 1997) “Global 
Markets and the Emerging Economies”, Lecture in honor of Fritz Leutwiler at The University of Zurich, 
December 15, 1997; Volcker, Paul (April 2001) “Globalization and the World of finance”, The 2001 
Hutchinson Lecture, University of Delaware, April 30, 2001 .
18 Greenspan, Alan (2005)  “Remarks on the Current account”, At Advancing Enterprise 2005 
Conference, London, February 4, 2005, Federal Reserve Board  .
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caught off guard, like all the major monetary and financial decision-makers 
in the US and the world, by the magnitude and suddenness of the crisis . Yet,, 
once he realized the magnitude of the threats to the financial system, proved to 
be ready to turn his back on some of the most basic traditions of central bank 
policy, to adopt bold measures and to improvise solutions without worrying 
about what his former colleagues in the academic world, the “high priests of 
the monetary doctrine” will say . 
At the same time, he has shown so far, at least in his actions and in his public 
statements, no readiness to question and even less to break with the forty-
year old American academic and official tradition of monetary nationalism and 
suspicion of suggestions of a new rule-based international monetary system . 
In his earlier academic work Bernanke, while demonstrating the policy errors 
committed under the gold-exchange standard of the 1930s and that countries 
that turned to monetary nationalism were “better off”, does not seem to have 
been interested in the intellectual and political challenge of building a better 
international system or order . In his pre-crisis statements already as a Governor 
of the Federal Reserve System he emphasized the primacy of monetary 
policy independence and the incompatibility of the objective of independent 
monetary policy with a rule-based international order . 19
Monetary nationalism was not always the mantra of the US . In fact, during 
the last hundred years the American position with respect to international 
monetary order has been marked by a certain number of constants and as well 
as by dramatic swings . 
Thus, the US was one of the driving forces behind attempts at international 
monetary cooperation in the decade following the First World War . Yet, it 
was also one of the major powers that through lack of insight and through 
economic nationalism contributed in the 1930s to the ultimate breakdown of 
the international monetary system based on the gold-exchange standard . 
After the end of the Second World War the United States played an even 
more active and influential role in the attempts of creating a new liberal 
international order . International monetary order, based on an updated version 
of the gold-exchange standard was to be a central element of the new universal 
international order . Also, when re-establishing convertibility for the currencies 
of the war-torn economies (and for those countries that had not fallen under 
communist domination) proved to be a daunting, an apparently hopeless task, 
it was the United States that stepped in to help create and finance a regional 
temporary solution through the resources and institutions of the Marshall 
Plan . In doing so the United States also accepted an at least temporary 
discrimination – because of the apparent “dollar shortage” – against the dollar 
by the beneficiaries of American aid . 
19 Bernanke, Ben S .: Essays on the Great Depression, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2000; 
Bernanke, Ben S . (2004) “Remarks”, At the Cato Institute 22nd Annual Monetary Conference, 
Washington, D .C ., October 14, 2004 .
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Under the Bretton Woods system the United States accepted important 
responsibilities . The so-called key-currency system imposed at least as 
important obligations and limitations on monetary sovereignty on the key-
currency country as on the other members of the system . The two most 
obvious obligations had to do with the exchange rate of the dollar and with 
the promise to sell gold against dollar to any central bank that asked for it . 
The general obligation was: maintaining trust in the dollar . Obviously trust is 
an elusive concept and, as was pointed out by Professor Triffin, a difficult one 
to maintain at the time when the world was keen on increasing the supply of 
dollars (in order to have a greater cushion of international reserves) and that 
this could be achieved only through a deficit in the US balance of payments .
Governments and central banks of small economies, if they have experience 
and are blessed with common sense, are not likely to believe in “unlimited 
freedom” for domestic monetary and fiscal policies, even in a world of “perfect 
floating” or all-round exchange controls, the two most common tools of 
isolating the national economy from the outside world . They will also learn 
how to adjust their policies to the conditions in world markets and to the 
behavior of the “elephants” or the policies of the large powers out there, be 
these policies inflationary or deflationary, or simply erratic or even reckless . 
In fact, the monetary and financial record of “small open economies” such as 
Switzerland20, is on the whole superior to that of the “economic great powers”, 
not to mention the so-called “super-power”, the United States . 
It is one of the central theses of this article that in large economies the 
political need for external rules is as important (or even more) as in small ones . 
It is the leaders of “great powers” – responsible for “growth and prosperity” 
in their large domestic economy – that tend to fall victims of the temptation 
to ignore real or alleged external or “balance-of-payments” constraints . They 
believe that without the rules and constraints of an international monetary 
system they could have the full autonomy pursue their domestic policy goals, 
whether this be to fight inflation more efficiently or to stimulate their economies 
more effectively, or both . Yet, the de facto solidarity those “virtuous” (surplus) 
countries and the discipline that “profligate” (deficit) countries have to accept 
through the workings of a rule-based system are both in their domestic interest 
and among the principal functions of an international monetary system in an 
integrated, liberal world economy . 
The illusions of “total domestic policy and market freedom” that befell the 
Federal Reserve and the American administrations from Johnson through early 
Carter, early Regan and then again late Clinton and the whole eight years of 
Bush junior, and the consequences of the strongly held views on the advantages 
of monetary nationalism not only by political leaders, but also by “world class 
20 It is symptomatic that the financial and monetary record and stability of Switzerland, a country 
that earned its well-deserved reputation through prudent private and public management, was not 
jeopardized by the monetary policies of the Swiss National Bank or the fiscal policies at the national, 
cantonal or local levels, but by private speculators and in particular by the ambitions and reckless 
policies of its largest private bank, UBS .
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economists”, on the US and the world economy, should be a telling lesson of 
the political and economic importance of the “external constraint” resulting 
from the rules of international monetary order . 
The intellectual and political challenge is to dispel this fallacy and reorient 
both theory and practice towards international cooperation .
4 .2 . european monetary reGionaliSm
It is the European countries that have followed the most determined 
approach to overcome the consequences of the international monetary 
disorders and of the emergence in the 1970s of a de facto regime of floating 
exchange rates . However, the position of the major European countries, 
including France and Germany, towards the international monetary system and 
towards international monetary reform has shown some major contradictions 
and dichotomies between the official interpretation of “national interests”, on 
the one hand, and the actual interests of the German, respectively the French 
economy . In fact both Germany and France, in their own ways, contributed 
(along with the United States) to “ending Bretton Woods” and to preventing 
the return to a global international monetary system . In Europe also, it was the 
claims for “policy autonomy” by the large economies and the growing monetary 
and economic rift between Germany, France and Italy (and Britain) in the 
1970s and in the early 1990s that threatened both the political and economic 
achievements of European economic integration and that led to the political 
insight that paved the way for EMS and ultimately for EMU and the Euro . The 
European Monetary System, and subsequently the European Monetary Union, 
had both an economic and political objective: it was, however, the political 
leadership in the major countries that made them become reality, despite the 
skepticism of a majority of academic economists about the desirability and 
the feasibility of these projects in both the “strong” and the “weak” currency 
countries. Without Helmut Schmidt and Giscard d’Estaing, and without François 
Mitterand and Helmut Kohl, monetary stability and monetary unification would 
been unattainable objectives .
It could be argued that: “Increased monetary convergence and exchange rate 
stability were indispensable for overcoming “Europessimism” and for adopting 
the Single European Act. The EMS helped create the monetary conditions for 
“Europe 1992”, for the Maastricht Treaty and for the plans of for the European 
Monetary Union and a common European currency. The lack of coordination 
with the US has been one of the main sources of the crisis of the EMS witnessed 
in 1992 and 1993. One of the principal shortcomings of the original “Delors 
Report” was that they completely ignored the worldwide dimensions of 
international stability.” 21Hieronymi (1995:62). The regional approach may or 
21 Hieronymi, Otto (1995) “The Case for an ‘Extended EMS’: A New International Monetary Order to be 
Built by Europe, Japan and the United States”, in Szabo-Pelsoeczy, Miklos (Editor): The Global Monetary 
System After the Fall of the Soviet Empire, (In Memoriam Robert Triffin – 1911-1993, Sixth Conference 
of the Robert Triffin-Sziràk Foundation, Sziràk, 1993), Averbury, Aldershot, 1995, Paul62
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may not have been in the late 1970s and in the early 1990s the only realistic 
approach given the US lack of interest in systemic issues under the succeeding 
Democratic, Republican and again Democratic US Administrations . 
Yet, the deliberate ignoring of the external dimension of the EMS and then of 
the EMU was short-sighted and reflected rearguard action of the academic and 
political advocates of floating . The agreement was that the European Central 
Bank should be modeled on the German Bundesbank: as the Bundesbank 
no longer had any exchange rate responsibilities, and in fact had become a 
principal bastion of “virtuous (i .e . anti-inflationary)” monetary nationalism, it 
was inconceivable that the ECB should ever be concerned about the exchange 
rate of the Euro . This was the political price to be paid for the creation of 
the EMU – and as the record shows a heavy price in terms of exchange rate 
stability towards the rest of the world and in terms of economic cohesion of 
the EMU and the economic performance of the individual members . Today, 
Monsieur Trichet, the President of the ECB and his colleagues on the Board, as 
well as most of the professional staff of the European Central Bank seem to be 
committed to the idea that external floating is the best “system” for Western 
Europe . A system that would include the EMU as a unit, with binding rules 
against monetary nationalism, is for them intellectual and political heresy, as it 
is for the majority of experts on the other side of the Atlantic . 
In this context it is useful to remember that well into the 1990s professors 
and bankers, not only in Germany and in Switzerland and Britain were betting 
that the common European currency would never become a reality .
4 .3 . the caSe of Japan
Why Japan? Why project a major role for Japan in restoring international 
monetary order? Why not China? Today, there is a regrettable tendency to 
underestimate the economic and political importance of Japan – both for its 
partners in the “Western Community” and for the international community 
and the world economy as a whole . This fallacy is the reverse of the one that 
could be observed in the 1970s and 1980s of overestimating the potential of 
Japan and the populist warnings against the danger of “Japanese economic 
domination” . 
Part of this tendency of “writing off” Japan has to do with country’s 
tendency to keep a low profile in the international economic and monetary 
policy debate and its reluctance in particular to make international institutional 
initiatives or major reform proposals . This was and remains especially true in 
the international monetary and financial area – a field that has been of vital 
importance for the Japanese economy for many years .
As pointed out by a former Japanese Ministry of Finance official in the early 
1990s: “At the same time I have to admit that for most of this period Japan’s 
posture in dealig with those international monetary issues was dominated by 
very strong features. One was clear passivity, in the sense that Japan was quite 
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reluctant to play a role on the main stage. She wanted to mind her own business 
at home without being mixed up with others. There was also a very strong, 
almost overwhelming, preoccupation with the bilateral relationship with the 
United States.”22 Gyothen (1992:17).The Japanese authorities and “opinion-
leaders” bear a substantial share of the responsibility for the “marasm” that 
has befallen the Japanese economy since the early 1990s and for the series of 
international financial crises of the 1990s and of the 21st century . The continued 
passivity of the Japanese government and of the Japanese economists and 
opinion leaders towards the need for a reform of the international monetary 
and financial system even despite the evidence of the negative impact of the 
absence of a rule-based international system on the Japanese economy is 
truly astonishing . 23
In the 1970s and 1980s the Japanese economy and policy making 
have been characterized by a strong performance and emphasis on the 
“real” aide of the economy and much less on monetary issues and financial 
and monetary reform . The main concern of Japanese policy makers and of 
Japanese companies was to avoid protectionist measures against Japanese 
exports – in particular in the United States and in Europe – and to counter 
upward pressures on the yen in the markets . For Japan Camp David and the 
Smithsonian meeting came as a true shock, yet Japanese companies could live 
with the higher yen in the 1970s. 
The 1970s saw a veritable myth develop around the strength of Japanese 
economic policy making . The power of the Ministry of Finance and in particular 
the close ties between MITI and the leading industrial companies became the 
subject of countless studies . Also, the combination of flexibility and ability to 
adjust to changing conditions with an increasingly technology driven innovation 
made the Japanese economy the star performer in the 1970s and 1980s. A 
much admired feature of the Japanese policy mix was the emphasis on long-
term economic and technological forecasting that allowed Japan not only to 
catch up in many areas with the United States and Europe, but also to achieve 
leadership in a number of important sectors .
In the case of Japan the consequences of passivity on the issue of the 
reform of international monetary order, on the one hand, and accepting 
American pressures for “financial liberalization and deregulation” in order to 
avoid American restrictions on Japanese exports, on the other hand, proved to 
backfire on both accounts . 
The yen-dollar exchange rate was subject to wide swings of periods of 
overvaluation and under-valuation (this latter in particular during the first half 
of the 1980s) demonstrating the fallacy of the assumption that freely floating 
22 Toyoo Gyothen in Volcker, Paul and Gyothen, Toyoo (1992) Changing Fortunes: The World’s Money 
and the Threat to American Leadership, Times Books, New York, 1992 Paul 17
23 Shirakawa, Masaaki “Preventing the Next Crisis: the Nexus between Financial Markets, Financial 
Institutions and Central Banks” Speech at the London Stock Exchange by the Governor of the Bank 
of Japan, Bank of Japan, May 13, 2009.
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exchange rates tend to converge towards “equilibrium” and accelerating direct 
investments by Japanese companies in their major export markets, and in 
particular in the United States . 
The arguments of frustrated American negotiators during the Reagan and 
Bush Administrations was that if “Japanese consumers are not willing to buy 
enough American manufactured or agricultural products” to correct the trade 
imbalance, Japan should liberalize, deregulate and “modernize” its banking 
and financial sector on the American model – in order to create a “level-playing 
field” for the more “modern” and “competitive” American financial firms in 
Japan . 
The effect was unexpected although not entirely unpredictable . There is no 
doubt that among all the OECD countries that introduced a rapid and massive 
“deregulation” of its banking and financial sector, Japan suffered the greatest 
and most lasting losses – at least until the current crisis as so far it is not 
possible to evaluate what the cumulative losses suffered by the American and 
European from the financial collapse of 2007-2009 will be. In Japan all the 
major actors – households, companies, banks and last but not least the public 
sector – ended up  worse off in terms of both current income and long-term 
asset positions than they would have been with a more prudent approach to 
financial reform and liberalization . 
5 . concluSionS: the proSpectS for a Joint initiative By the uS, europe and 
Japan
5 .1 . the purpoSe and functionS of an “extended emS”
The general argument in favor of reform is that that most of the arguments 
of the critics of the conditions prevailing since the 1970s turned out to be right 
and the arguments of the new orthodoxy were disproved by events . Exchange 
rate fluctuations have been more frequent and more erratic than the early 
defenders of floating had argued that they would be . The system of floating 
exchange rates has amplified exchange-rate and relative-price distortions and 
there has been no self-correcting tendency towards “equilibrium” exchange 
rates . Also the absence of rules has allowed the accumulation of major 
fundamental disequilibria and ultimately led to short-term speculation as the 
principal dimension of financial activity .
Without an appropriate international monetary order the world is a more 
uncertain and dangerous place, where power and monetary nationalism 
undermine and weaken the achievements of cooperation and the respect for 
common rules in other areas .
The issue is not only how to deal with exchange rate fluctuations but 
more broadly the issue of optimum policy mixes and of transparency and 
predictability and accountability .
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The system has to be based on rules and policies . A system based purely 
on “consultations” and “policy coordination”, without at least some key binding 
rules would be clearly insufficient . The rules have to apply to governments, 
central banks as well as private financial institutions . Without agreement on 
the objectives and organizing principles it is no use to argue about technical 
solutions or to claim that the best solutions are “politically unacceptable” .
A successful reform is a long-term process, with a fair amount of trial and 
error and setbacks . The sequence has to be the following: 1 . objectives, common 
values and basic organizing principles; 2 . search for “technical solutions” and 
drafting of a concrete plan and program; 3 . negotiations among a small group 
of major and like-minded actors; 4 . implementation . 
The approach proposed here – i .e . to start with a “regional approach” 
by the US, Europe and Japan, and then gradually extend its scope to all 
potential partners – is inspired by the sequence from regional to more global 
convertibility in the 1950s. 
The actual features of the “extended EMS” will be the result of close 
negotiations and trial and error at several stages . However, from the start 
the principal functions and issues will have to include:  (1) exchange rates; 
(2) balance-of-payments equilibrium; (3) international reserves; (4) monetary 
and fiscal discipline; (5) the role of central banks and (6) the division of tasks 
between markets and monetary authorities .
5 .2 . the role and intereStS of the uS, europe and Japan
Domestic and international instability are a threat to the market economy 
and ultimately also to democracy . According to Paul Volcker, recalling the 
success of the fight against inflation in the US and in other countries: “What 
will count in the end is credibility—a recognition that there is national interest 
in greater stabilization and a willingness to act . That credibility will require time 
to attain . I would argue it is attainable .”24Volcker (2001) .The US, Europe and 
Japan are the most complete and most highly developed and sophisticated 
democracies and market economies in the world . For them abandoning 
the market economy and international economic integration is neither an 
economic nor a political option . It is no exaggeration that the future of the 
market economy and of international economic integration depends to a 
significant extent on these three countries and areas and on their function as 
“role models” in the world economy . 
International economic integration has played an essential role in the 
growth and prosperity of the United States, Europe and Japan in the last sixty 
years . Each one of them contributed to the expansion of world trade and at 
the same time benefited from the growing integration of the world economy . 
24 Volcker, Paul (April 2001) “Globalization and the World of finance”, The 2001 Hutchinson Lecture, 
University of Delaware, April 30, 2001 .
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Their future prosperity will continue to depend on the stability and proper 
functioning of the international economic system . Despite their size, external 
shocks and systemic malfunctions can have a major impact on their overall 
economic performance and outlook . 
Also, notwithstanding their size and large “domestic markets” and their 
weight in the world economy, neither one of the three can afford “to go it 
alone”: neither the US, nor Europe, nor Japan could benefit from attempting 
a policy of “fortress Europe”, “fortress Japan” of “fortress US” – in trade or in 
the monetary field . 
In conclusions, the arguments for the US, Europe and Japan to seek to 
create an “extended EMS” can be summed up in the following three points:
1 .  Any approach to the reform of the international monetary system that 
would exclude one of the three “pillars” is bound to be incomplete and 
would lead to a more rather than a less fragmented monetary order . The 
futility of a bilateral approach “to the China problem” by the Secretary 
of Treasury in the Bush administration was evident even before it started 
and showed the lack of long-term thinking about international order 
and cooperation that had characterized the eight years of the Bush 
Administration .
2 .  Any agreement about monetary order – domestic or international – is 
and has to be first and foremost a political one . This is one of the major 
points on which both the skeptics and the optimists about international 
monetary reform tend to agree . Thus, if it is not possible to reach an 
agreement among the three major pillars of democracy and the market 
economy in the world, among those who during the last sixty years have 
developed a de facto community that has been responsible for both 
their security and prosperity, it is difficult to imagine that effective initial 
progress could be achieved in a more heterogeneous constellation (IMF, 
Group of 20, etc .) .
3 .  The third argument is that from the start the new system has to be 
designed as an open and equitable monetary order, that would take 
into account the interests of all potential participants – including the 
so-called emerging markets . Thus, the success and growing weight of 
some of the new “emerging markets” such as China, India or Brazil is not 
a valid argument against closer cooperation and common initiatives of 
the “three pillars” of the liberal international economic order: they are 
rather an argument for greater responsibility . The emerging markets – 
large and small economies – as well as the least developed economies 
can only benefit if the three weightiest free market economies effectively 
cooperate to recreate a well-functioning international monetary order . 
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